Sentenza

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MESSERSCHMIDT ET AL. v. MILLENDER, EXECUTOR OF ESTATE OF MILLENDER, DECEASED, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–704. Argued December 5, 2011—Decided February 22, 2012
Shelly Kelly was afraid that she would be attacked by her boyfriend,Jerry Ray Bowen, while she moved out of her apartment. She therefore requested police protection. Two officers arrived, but they were called away to an emergency. As soon as the officers left, Bowen showed up at the apartment, yelled “I told you never to call the copson me bitch!” and attacked Kelly, attempting to throw her over a second-story landing. After Kelly escaped to her car, Bowen pointed asawed-off shotgun at her and threatened to kill her if she tried toleave. Kelly nonetheless sped away as Bowen fired five shots at thecar, blowing out one of its tires. Kelly later met with Detective Curt Messerschmidt to discuss the incident. She described the attack in detail, mentioned that Bowen had previously assaulted her, that he had ties to the Mona ParkCrips gang, and that he might be staying at the home of his formerfoster mother, Augusta Millender. Following this conversation, Messerschmidt conducted a detailed investigation, during which he confirmed Bowen's connection to the Millenders' home, verified his membership in two gangs, and learned that Bowen had been arrested and convicted for numerous violent and firearm-related offenses. Based on this investigation, Messerschmidt drafted an applicationfor a warrant authorizing a search of the Millenders' home for allfirearms and ammunition, as well as evidence indicating gang membership. Messerschmidt included two affidavits in the warrant application.The first detailed his extensive law enforcement experience and hisspecialized training in gang-related crimes. The second, expressly incorporated into the search warrant, described the incident and ex2
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plained why Messerschmidt believed there was probable cause for the search. It also requested that the warrant be endorsed for night service because of Bowen's gang ties. Before submitting the applicationto a magistrate for approval, Messerschmidt had it reviewed by hissupervisor, Sergeant Robert Lawrence, as well as a police lieutenantand a deputy district attorney. Messerschmidt then submitted the application to a magistrate, who issued the warrant. The ensuingsearch uncovered only Millender's shotgun, a California Social Services letter addressed to Bowen, and a box of .45-caliber ammunition.
The Millenders filed an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against petitioners Messerschmidt and Lawrence, alleging that the officers had subjected them to an unreasonable search in violation of the FourthAmendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to theMillenders, concluding that the firearm and gang-material aspects of the search warrant were overbroad and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from damages. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the warrant's authorization was unconstitutionally overbroad because the affidavits and warrant failed to establish probablecause that the broad categories of firearms, firearm-related material,and gang-related material were contraband or evidence of a crime, and that a reasonable officer would have been aware of the warrant's deficiency.
Held: The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Pp. 8−19.
(a) Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liabilityfor civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonableperson would have known.' ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231. Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner, or in “objective good faith.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922–923. Nonetheless, that fact does not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness. The Court has recognized an exception allowing suit when “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341. The “shield of immunity” otherwise conferred by the warrant, id., at 345, will be lost, for example, where the warrant was “based on an affidavit solacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in itsexistence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U. S., at 923. The threshold for establishing this exception is high. “[I]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination” because “[i]t is the magistrate's responsiCite
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bility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with therequirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, supra, at 921. Pp.8−10.
(b)
This case does not fall within that narrow exception. It would not be entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that there wasprobable cause to search for all firearms and firearm-related materials. Under the circumstances set forth in the warrant, an officer could reasonably conclude that there was a “fair probability” that thesawed-off shotgun was not the only firearm Bowen owned, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238, and that Bowen's sawed-off shotgun was illegal. Cf. 26 U. S. C. §§ 5845(a), 5861(d). Given Bowen's possessionof one illegal gun, his gang membership, willingness to use the gun tokill someone, and concern about the police, it would not be unreasonable for an officer to conclude that Bowen owned other illegal guns. An officer also could reasonably believe that seizure of firearms wasnecessary to prevent further assaults on Kelly. California law allows a magistrate to issue a search warrant for items “in the possession of any person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a public offense,” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1524(a)(3), and the warrantapplication submitted by the officers specifically referenced this provision as a basis for the search. Pp. 10–12.
(c)
Regarding the warrant's authorization to search for gangrelated materials, a reasonable officer could view Bowen's attack as motivated not by the souring of his romantic relationship with Kellybut by a desire to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activity to the police. It would therefore not be unreasonable—based on the facts set out in the affidavit—for an officer to believe that evidence of Bowen's gang affiliation would prove helpful in prosecuting him for the attack on Kelly, in supporting additional, related charges against Bowen for the assault, or in impeaching Bowen or rebuttinghis defenses. Moreover, even if this were merely a domestic dispute,a reasonable officer could still conclude that gang paraphernalia found at the Millenders' residence could demonstrate Bowen's control over the premises or his connection to other evidence found there.Pp. 12−16.
(d)
The fact that the officers sought and obtained approval of the warrant application from a superior and a deputy district attorney before submitting it to the magistrate provides further support for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause. A contraryconclusion would mean not only that Messerschmidt and Lawrencewere “plainly incompetent” in concluding that the warrant was supported by probable cause, Malley, supra, at 341, but that their super4
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visor, the deputy district attorney, and the magistrate were as well.Pp. 16−18.
(e) In holding that the warrant in this case was so obviously defective that no reasonable officer could have believed it to be valid, the court below erred in relying on Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551. There, officers who carried out a warrant-approved search were notentitled to qualified immunity because the warrant failed to describe any of the items to be seized and “even a cursory reading of the warrant” would have revealed this defect. Id., at 557. Here, in contrast, any arguable defect would have become apparent only upon a closeparsing of the warrant application, and a comparison of the supporting affidavit to the terms of the warrant to determine whether the affidavit established probable cause to search for all the items listed inthe warrant. Unlike in Groh, any error here would not be one that“just a simple glance” would have revealed. Id. at 564. Pp. 18−19.
620 F. 3d 1016, reversed.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10–704
CURT MESSERSCHMIDT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
BRENDA MILLENDER, AS EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF AUGUSTA MILLENDER,
DECEASED, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[February 22, 2012]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of theCourt.
Petitioner police officers conducted a search of respondents' home pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. The warrant authorized a search for all guns and gang-related material, in connection with the investigation of a known gang member for shooting at his exgirlfriend with a pistol-gripped sawed-off shotgun, becauseshe had “call[ed] the cops” on him. App. 56. Respondents brought an action seeking to hold the officers personally liable under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that the searchviolated their Fourth Amendment rights because there was not sufficient probable cause to believe the items sought were evidence of a crime. In particular, respondents argued that there was no basis to search for all guns simply because the suspect owned and had used a sawed-off shotgun, and no reason to search for gang material because the shooting at the ex-girlfriend for “call[ing]the cops” was solely a domestic dispute. The Court of
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the warrant was invalid, and that the officers were not entitled to immunity from personal liability because this invalidity was soobvious that any reasonable officer would have recognized it, despite the magistrate's approval. We disagree and reverse.
I
A
Shelly Kelly decided to break off her romantic relationship with Jerry Ray Bowen and move out of her apartment, to which Bowen had a key. Kelly feared an attackfrom Bowen, who had previously assaulted her and had been convicted of multiple violent felonies. She therefore asked officers from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to accompany her while she gathered her things.Deputies from the Sheriff 's Department came to assistKelly but were called away to respond to an emergency before the move was complete.
As soon as the officers left, an enraged Bowen appeared at the bottom of the stairs to the apartment, yelling “I toldyou never to call the cops on me bitch!” App. 39, 56.Bowen then ran up the stairs to Kelly, grabbed her by her shirt, and tried to throw her over the railing of the secondstory landing. When Kelly successfully resisted, Bowenbit her on the shoulder and attempted to drag her insidethe apartment by her hair. Kelly again managed to escapeBowen's grasp, and ran to her car. By that time, Bowen had retrieved a black sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip. He ran in front of Kelly's car, pointed the shotgun at her, and told Kelly that if she tried to leave he would kill her. Kelly leaned over, fully depressed the gas pedal, and sped away. Bowen fired at the car a total of five times, blowing out the car's left front tire in the process, but Kelly managed to escape.
Kelly quickly located police officers and reported the
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assault. She told the police what had happened—thatBowen had attacked her after becoming “angry because she had called the Sheriff's Department”—and she mentioned that Bowen was “an active member of the ‘Mona Park Crips,'” a local street gang. Id., at 39. Kelly alsoprovided the officers with photographs of Bowen.
Detective Curt Messerschmidt was assigned to investigate the incident. Messerschmidt met with Kelly to obtaindetails of the assault and information about Bowen. Kellydescribed the attack and informed Messerschmidt that she thought Bowen was staying at his foster mother's home at 2234 East 120th Street. Kelly also informed Messerschmidt of Bowen's previous assaults on her and of hisgang ties.
Messerschmidt then conducted a background check on Bowen by consulting police records, California Department of Motor Vehicles records, and the “cal-gang” database. Based on this research, Messerschmidt confirmed Bowen's connection to the 2234 East 120th Street address. He also confirmed that Bowen was an “active” member of the Mona Park Crips and a “secondary” member of the Dodge City Crips. Id., at 64. Finally, Messerschmidtlearned that Bowen had been arrested and convicted for numerous violent and firearm-related offenses. Indeed, at the time of the investigation, Bowen's “rapsheet” spanned over 17 printed pages, and indicated that he had beenarrested at least 31 times. Nine of these arrests were for firearms offenses and six were for violent crimes, including three arrests for assault with a deadly weapon (firearm). Id., at 72–81.
Messerschmidt prepared two warrants: one to authorize Bowen's arrest and one to authorize the search of 2234 East 120th Street. An attachment to the search warrant described the property that would be the object of thesearch:
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“All handguns, rifles, or shotguns of any caliber, or any firearms capable of firing ammunition, or firearms or devices modified or designed to allow it [sic]to fire ammunition. All caliber of ammunition, miscellaneous gun parts, gun cleaning kits, holsters whichcould hold or have held any caliber handgun being sought. Any receipts or paperwork, showing the purchase, ownership, or possession of the handguns being sought. Any firearm for which there is no proof of ownership. Any firearm capable of firing or chambered to fire any caliber ammunition.
“Articles of evidence showing street gang membership or affiliation with any Street Gang to include but not limited to any reference to ‘Mona Park Crips', including writings or graffiti depicting gang membership,activity or identity. Articles of personal propertytending to establish the identity of person [sic] in control of the premise or premises. Any photographs orphotograph albums depicting persons, vehicles, weapons or locations, which may appear relevant to gang membership, or which may depict the item being sought and or believed to be evidence in the case being investigated on this warrant, or which may depict evidence of criminal activity. Additionally to include any gang indicia that would establish the persons being sought in this warrant, affiliation or membershipwith the ‘Mona Park Crips' street gang.” Id., at 52.
Two affidavits accompanied Messerschmidt's warrant applications. The first affidavit described Messerschmidt's extensive law enforcement experience, including that hehad served as a peace officer for 14 years, that he was then assigned to a “specialized unit” “investigating gangrelated crimes and arresting gang members for variousviolations of the law,” that he had been involved in “hunCite
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dreds of gang related incidents, contacts, and or arrests”during his time on the force, and that he had “received specialized training in the field of gang related crimes” and training in “gang related shootings.” Id., at 53–54.
The second affidavit—expressly incorporated into thesearch warrant—explained why Messerschmidt believed there was sufficient probable cause to support the warrant. That affidavit described the facts of the incident involving Kelly and Bowen in great detail, including the weapon used in the assault. The affidavit recounted that Kelly had identified Bowen as the assailant and that she thought Bowen might be found at 2234 East 120th Street. It also reported that Messerschmidt had “conducted an extensive background search on the suspect by utilizing departmental records, state computer records, and otherpolice agency records,” and that from that information hehad concluded that Bowen resided at 2234 East 120th Street. Id., at 58.
The affidavit requested that the search warrant be endorsed for night service because “information provided by the victim and the cal-gang data base” indicated thatBowen had “gang ties to the Mona Park Crip gang” and that “night service would provide an added element of safety to the community as well as for the deputy personnel serving the warrant.” Id., at 59. The affidavit concluded by noting that Messerschmidt “believe[d] that the items sought” would be in Bowen's possession and that “recovery of the weapon could be invaluable in the successful prosecution of the suspect involved in this case, and the curtailment of further crimes being committed.” Ibid.
Messerschmidt submitted the warrants to his supervisors—Sergeant Lawrence and Lieutenant Ornales—forreview. Deputy District Attorney Janet Wilson also reviewed the materials and initialed the search warrant, indicating that she agreed with Messerschmidt's assessment of probable cause. Id., at 27, 47. Finally, Messer6
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schmidt submitted the warrants to a magistrate. The magistrate approved the warrants and authorized nightservice.
The search warrant was served two days later by a teamof officers that included Messerschmidt and Lawrence. Sheriff's deputies forced open the front door of 2234 East120th Street and encountered Augusta Millender—a woman in her seventies—and Millender's daughter andgrandson. As instructed by the police, the Millenderswent outside while the residence was secured but remained in the living room while the search was conducted. Bowen was not found in the residence. The search did, however, result in the seizure of Augusta Millender'sshotgun, a California Social Services letter addressed toBowen, and a box of .45-caliber ammunition.
Bowen was arrested two weeks later after Messerschmidt found him hiding under a bed in a motel room.
B The Millenders filed suit in Federal District Court against the County of Los Angeles, the sheriff 's department, the sheriff, and a number of individual officers, including Messerschmidt and Lawrence. The complaintalleged, as relevant here, that the search warrant wasinvalid under the Fourth Amendment. It sought damages from Messerschmidt and Lawrence, among others. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgmenton the validity of the search warrant. The District Court found the warrant defective in two respects. The District Court concluded that the warrant's authorization to search for firearms was unconstitutionally overbroadbecause the “crime specified here was a physical assault with a very specific weapon”—a black sawed-off shotgunwith a pistol grip—negating any need to “search for all firearms.” Millender v. County of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 05–2298 (CD Cal., Mar. 15, 2007), App. to Pet. for Cert.
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106, 157, 2007 WL 7589200, *21. The court also found the warrant overbroad with respect to the search for gangrelated materials, because there “was no evidence that the crime at issue was gang-related.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
157. As a result, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Millenders on their constitutional challenges to the firearm and gang material aspects of the search warrant. Id., at 160. The District Court also rejected the officers' claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity from damages. Id., at 171.
Messerschmidt and Lawrence appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of qualified immunity. 564 F. 3d 1143 (2009). The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because “they reasonably relied on the approval of the warrant by a deputy district attorney and a judge.” Id., at 1145.
The Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc and affirmed the District Court's denial of qualified immunity. 620 F. 3d 1016 (CA9 2010). The en banc court concluded that the warrant's authorization was unconstitutionally overbroad because the affidavit and the warrant failed to “establish[ ] probable cause that the broad categories of firearms, firearm-related material, and gang-relatedmaterial described in the warrant were contraband or evidence of a crime.” Id., at 1033. In the en banc court's view, “the deputies had probable cause to search for asingle, identified weapon . . . . They had no probable causeto search for the broad class of firearms and firearmrelated materials described in the warrant.” Id., at 1027. In addition, “[b]ecause the deputies failed to establish anylink between gang-related materials and a crime, thewarrant authorizing the search and seizure of all gangrelated evidence [was] likewise invalid.” Id., at 1031. Concluding that “a reasonable officer in the deputies' position would have been well aware of this deficiency,”
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the en banc court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 1033–1035.
There were two separate dissenting opinions. JudgeCallahan determined that “the officers had probable cause to search for and seize any firearms in the home in which Bowen, a gang member and felon, was thought to reside.” Id., at 1036. She also concluded that “the officers reasonably relied on their superiors, the district attorney, andthe magistrate to correct” any overbreadth in the warrant,and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunitybecause their actions were not objectively unreasonable. Id., at 1044, 1049. Judge Silverman also dissented, concluding that the “deputies' belief in the validity of . . . the warrant was entirely reasonable” and that the “record [wa]s totally devoid of any evidence that the deputiesacted other than in good faith.” Id., at 1050. Judge Tallman joined both dissents.
We granted certiorari. 564 U. S. ___ (2011).
II The Millenders allege that they were subjected to an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the warrant authorizing the search of theirhome was not supported by probable cause. They seekdamages from Messerschmidt and Lawrence for their roles in obtaining and executing this warrant. The validity of the warrant is not before us. The question instead iswhether Messerschmidt and Lawrence are entitled to im- munity from damages, even assuming that the warrant should not have been issued. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar astheir conduct does not violate clearly established statutoryor constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800,
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818 (1982)). Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistakenjudgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetentor those who knowingly violate the law.'” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986)). “[W]hetheran official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official actiongenerally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were‘clearly established' at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639 (1987) (citation omitted).
Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that aneutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearestindication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in “objectivegood faith.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922–923 (1984).1 Nonetheless, under our precedents, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional search or seizure does not endthe inquiry into objective reasonableness. Rather, we have recognized an exception allowing suit when “it isobvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Malley, 475 U. S., at 341. The “shield of immunity” otherwise conferred bythe warrant, id., at 345, will be lost, for example, where the warrant was “based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its exist——————
1Although Leon involved the proper application of the exclusionary rule to remedy a Fourth Amendment violation, we have held that “thesame standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the con- text of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified immun- ity accorded an officer” who obtained or relied on an allegedly invalid warrant. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 344 (1986) (citation omitted); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 565, n. 8 (2004).
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ence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U. S., at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted).2
Our precedents make clear, however, that the threshold for establishing this exception is a high one, and it shouldbe. As we explained in Leon, “[i]n the ordinary case, anofficer cannot be expected to question the magistrate'sprobable-cause determination” because “[i]t is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer'sallegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue awarrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 921; see also Malley, supra, at 346, n. 9 (“It is a sound presumption that the magistrate is more qualified than the police officer to make aprobable cause determination, and it goes without sayingthat where a magistrate acts mistakenly in issuing a warrant but within the range of professional competence of a magistrate, the officer who requested the warrant cannot be held liable” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
III The Millenders contend, and the Court of Appeals held, that their case falls into this narrow exception. According to the Millenders, the officers “failed to provide any facts or circumstances from which a magistrate could properly
conclude that there was probable cause to seize the broad classes of items being sought,” and “[n]o reasonable officer ——————
2The dissent relies almost entirely on facts outside the affidavit,including Messerschmidt's deposition testimony, post, at 4, 11 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), crime analysis forms, post, at 5, Kelly's interview, post, at 5–6, and n. 5, Messerschmidt's notes regarding Kelly's interview, post, at 5–6, n. 5, and even several briefs filed in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, post, at 8–9, 12. In contrast, the dissent cites the probable cause affidavit itself only twice. See post, at
12. There is no contention before us that the affidavit was misleadingin omitting any of the facts on which the dissent relies. Cf. Leon, 468
U. S., at 923.
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would have presumed that such a warrant was valid.”Brief for Respondents 27. We disagree.
A With respect to the warrant's authorization to search forand seize all firearms, the Millenders argue that “a reasonably well-trained officer would have readily perceived that there was no probable cause to search the house for all firearms and firearm-related items.” Id., at 32. Notingthat “the affidavit indicated exactly what item was evidence of a crime—the ‘black sawed off shotgun with a pistol grip,'” they argue that “[n]o facts established thatBowen possessed any other firearms, let alone that suchfirearms (if they existed) were ‘contraband or evidence of a crime.'” Ibid. (quoting App. 56).Even if the scope of the warrant were overbroad inauthorizing a search for all guns when there was information only about a specific one, that specific one was a sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip, owned by a knowngang member, who had just fired the weapon five times inpublic in an attempt to murder another person, on theasserted ground that she had “call[ed] the cops” on him. Id., at 56. Under these circumstances—set forth in the warrant—it would not have been unreasonable for an officer to conclude that there was a “fair probability” that the sawed-off shotgun was not the only firearm Bowenowned. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238 (1983). And it certainly would have been reasonable for an officer toassume that Bowen's sawed-off shotgun was illegal. Cf. 26
U. S. C. §§5845(a), 5861(d). Evidence of one crime is not always evidence of several, but given Bowen's possession of one illegal gun, his gang membership, his willingness to use the gun to kill someone, and his concern about the police, a reasonable officer could conclude that therewould be additional illegal guns among others that Bowen
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owned.3
A reasonable officer also could believe that seizure of the firearms was necessary to prevent further assaults onKelly. California law allows a magistrate to issue a search warrant for items “in the possession of any person withthe intent to use them as a means of committing a publicoffense,” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1524(a)(3) (West 2011), and the warrant application submitted by the officersspecifically referenced this provision as a basis for the search. App. 48. Bowen had already attempted to murder Kelly once with a firearm, and had yelled “I'll kill you” asshe tried to escape from him. Id., at 56–57. A reasonable officer could conclude that Bowen would make another attempt on Kelly's life and that he possessed other firearms “with the intent to use them” to that end. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1524(a)(3).
Given the foregoing, it would not have been “entirely unreasonable” for an officer to believe, in the particularcircumstances of this case, that there was probable cause to search for all firearms and firearm-related materials. Leon, supra, at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the warrant's authorization to search forevidence of gang membership, the Millenders contend that “no reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavit presented to the magistrate contained a sufficient basis to conclude that the gang paraphernalia sought was contraband or evidence of a crime.” Brief for Respondents 28.They argue that “the magistrate [could not] have reasonably concluded, based on the affidavit, that Bowen's gang membership had anything to do with the crime underinvestigation” because “[t]he affidavit described a ‘spousal ——————
3The dissent caricatures our analysis as being that “because Bowenfired one firearm, it was reasonable for the police to conclude . . . that [he] must have possessed others,” post, at 10 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). This simply avoids coming to grips with the facts of the crime at issue.
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assault' that ensued after Kelly decided to end her ‘on going dating relationship' with Bowen” and “[n]othing in that description suggests that the crime was gangrelated.” Ibid. (quoting App. 55).
This effort to characterize the case solely as a domestic dispute, however, is misleading. Cf. post, at 5 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting); post, at 2 (KAGAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Messerschmidt beganhis affidavit in support of the warrant by explaining thathe “has been investigating an assault with a deadly weapon incident” and elaborated that the crime was a “spousal assault and an assault with a deadly weapon.” App. 55(emphasis added). The affidavit also stated that Bowen was “a known Mona Park Crip gang member” “based oninformation provided by the victim and the cal-gang database,”4 and that he had attempted to murder Kelly after becoming enraged that she had “call[ed] the cops on [him].” Id., at 56, 58–59. A reasonable officer could certainly view Bowen's attack as motivated not by the souring of his romantic relationship with Kelly but instead by a desire to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activity to the police. She was, after all, no longer linkedwith him as a girlfriend; he had assaulted her in the past; and she had indeed called the cops on him. And, as the affidavit supporting the warrant made clear, Kelly had infact given the police information about Bowen's gang ties. Id., at 59.5
—————— 4Although the cal-gang database states that information contained therein cannot be used to establish probable cause, see App. 64, the affidavit makes clear that Kelly also provided this information to Messerschmidt, id., at 59, as she did to the deputies who initiallyresponded to the attack, id., at 39 (describing Kelly's statement that Bowen was “an active member of the ‘Mona Park Crips' ”). We therefore need not decide whether the cal-gang database's disclaimer isrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. 5Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post, at 5–6, n. 5 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), the affidavit's account of Bowen's statements is
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It would therefore not have been unreasonable—based on the facts set out in the affidavit—for an officer to believe that evidence regarding Bowen's gang affiliationwould prove helpful in prosecuting him for the attack onKelly. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 307 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment allows a search for evidence when there is “probable cause . . . to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction”). Not only would suchevidence help to establish motive, either apart from or inaddition to any domestic dispute, it would also support thebringing of additional, related charges against Bowen for the assault. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §136.1(b)(1) (West 1999) (It is a crime to “attempt[ ] to prevent ordissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a crime from . . . [m]aking anyreport of that victimization to any . . . law enforcement officer”).6
—————— consistent with other accounts of the confrontation, in particular the report prepared by the officers who spoke with Kelly immediately after the attack. See App. 39 (stating that when Bowen “appeared at thebase of the stairs and began yelling at [Kelly,] [h]e was angry becauseshe had called the Sheriff 's Department”). And at no point during this litigation has the accuracy of the affidavit's account of the attack been called into question. 6The dissent relies heavily on Messerschmidt's deposition, in which he stated that Bowen's crime was not a “gang crime.” See post, at 4–7. Messerschmidt's belief about the nature of the crime, however, is not information he possessed but a conclusion he reached based on information known to him. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 641 (1987). We have “eschew[ed] inquiries into the subjective beliefs of law enforcement officers who seize evidence pursuant to a subsequentlyinvalidated warrant.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922, n. 23 (1984); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 815–819 (1982). In any event, as the dissent recognizes, the inquiry under our precedents is whether “a reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner's positionwould have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause.” Malley, 475 U. S., at 345 (emphasis added). Messerschmidt's own evaluation does not answer the question whether it would have been
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In addition, a reasonable officer could believe that evidence demonstrating Bowen's membership in a gang might prove helpful in impeaching Bowen or rebuttingvarious defenses he could raise at trial. For example, evidence that Bowen had ties to a gang that uses gunssuch as the one he used to assault Kelly would certainly berelevant to establish that he had familiarity with or accessto this type of weapon.
Moreover, even if this were merely a domestic dispute, areasonable officer could still conclude that gang paraphernalia found at the Millenders' residence would aid in the prosecution of Bowen by, for example, demonstratingBowen's connection to other evidence found there. The warrant authorized a search for “any gang indicia thatwould establish the persons being sought in this warrant,” and “[a]rticles of personal property tending to establish the identity of [the] person in control of the premise or premises.” App. 52. Before the District Court, the Millenders “acknowledge[d] that evidence of who controlled the premises would be relevant if incriminating evidence werefound and it became necessary to tie that evidence to aperson,” and the District Court approved that aspect ofthe warrant on this basis. App. to Pet. for Cert. 158–159 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given Bowen's knowngang affiliation, a reasonable officer could conclude that gang paraphernalia found at the residence would be aneffective means of demonstrating Bowen's control over the premises or his connection to evidence found there.7
—————— unreasonable for an officer to have reached a different conclusion from the facts in the affidavit. See n. 2, supra. 7The Fourth Amendment does not require probable cause to believeevidence will conclusively establish a fact before permitting a search, but only “probable cause . . . to believe the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.” Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 307 (1967) (emphasis added). Even if gangevidence might have turned out not to be conclusive because other
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Opinion of the Court
Whatever the use to which evidence of Bowen's ganginvolvement might ultimately have been put, it would nothave been “entirely unreasonable” for an officer to believe that the facts set out in the affidavit established a fair probability that such evidence would aid the prosecutionof Bowen for the criminal acts at issue. Leon, 468 U. S., at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B Whether any of these facts, standing alone or taken together, actually establish probable cause is a questionwe need not decide. Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments.” al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). The officers' judgment that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was not “plainly incompetent.” Malley, 475 U. S., at 341. On top of all this, the fact that the officers sought andobtained approval of the warrant application from a superior and a deputy district attorney before submitting it tothe magistrate provides further support for the conclusionthat an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause. Ibid. Before seeking to have the warrant issued by a magistrate, Messerschmidt conducted an extensive investigation into Bowen's background and the facts of the crime. Based on this investigation, Messerschmidt prepared a detailed warrant application that truthfully laid
—————— members of the Millender household also had gang ties, see post, at 8 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); post, at 2–3 (opinion of KAGAN, J.), a reasonable officer could still conclude that evidence of gang membershipwould help show Bowen's connection to the residence. Such evidence could, for example, have displayed Bowen's gang moniker (“C Jay”)or could have been identified by Kelly as belonging to Bowen. See App. 64.
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Opinion of the Court
out the pertinent facts. The only facts omitted—the offi- cers' knowledge of Bowen's arrest and conviction records, see supra, at 3—would only have strengthened the warrant. Messerschmidt then submitted the warrant application for review by Lawrence, another superior officer, and a deputy district attorney, all of whom approved the application without any apparent misgivings. Only after this did Messerschmidt seek the approval of a neutral magistrate, who issued the requested warrant. The officers thus “took every step that could reasonably be expected of them.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981, 989 (1984). In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that “no officer of reasonable competence would have requested thewarrant.” Malley, 475 U. S., at 346, n. 9. Indeed, a contrary conclusion would mean not only that Messerschmidt and Lawrence were “plainly incompetent,” id., at 341, but that their supervisor, the deputy district attorney, and themagistrate were as well.
The Court of Appeals, however, gave no weight to the fact that the warrant had been reviewed and approvedby the officers' superiors, a deputy district attorney, and a neutral magistrate. Relying on Malley, the court held that the officers had an “independent responsibility to ensurethere [was] at least a colorable argument for probable cause.” 620 F. 3d, at 1034. It explained that “[t]he deputies here had a responsibility to exercise their reasonable professional judgment,” and that “in circumstances suchas these a neutral magistrate's approval (and, a fortiori,a non-neutral prosecutor's) cannot absolve an officer of liability.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
We rejected in Malley the contention that an officer is automatically entitled to qualified immunity for seeking a warrant unsupported by probable cause, simply becausea magistrate had approved the application. 475 U. S., at
345. And because the officers' superior and the deputy district attorney are part of the prosecution team, their
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Opinion of the Court
review also cannot be regarded as dispositive. But by holding in Malley that a magistrate's approval does not automatically render an officer's conduct reasonable, we did not suggest that approval by a magistrate or reviewby others is irrelevant to the objective reasonableness of the officers' determination that the warrant was valid. Indeed, we expressly noted that we were not deciding “whether [the officer's] conduct in [that] case was in factobjectively reasonable.” Id., at 345, n. 8. The fact that the officers secured these approvals is certainly pertinent in assessing whether they could have held a reasonable belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause.
C In holding that the warrant in this case was so obviously defective that no reasonable officer could have believed it was valid, the court below relied heavily on our decision in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551 (2004), but that precedent is far afield. There, we held that officers who carried out a warrant-approved search were not entitled to qualified immunity because the warrant in question failed todescribe the items to be seized at all. Id., at 557. We explained that “[i]n the portion of the form that called fora description of the ‘person or property' to be seized, [theapplicant] typed a description of [the target's] two-story blue house rather than the alleged stockpile of firearms.” Id., at 554. Thus, the warrant stated nonsensically that “‘there is now concealed [on the specified premises] a certain person or property, namely [a] single dwelling residence two story in height which is blue in color and has two additions attached to the east.'” Id., at 554–555,
n. 2 (bracketed material in original). Because “even a cursory reading of the warrant in [that] case—perhapsjust a simple glance—would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would have known was constitutionally fatal,” id., at 564, we held that
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Opinion of the Court
the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The instant case is not remotely similar. In contrast to Groh, any defect here would not have been obvious from the face of the warrant. Rather, any arguable defectwould have become apparent only upon a close parsing of the warrant application, and a comparison of the affidavit to the terms of the warrant to determine whether the affidavit established probable cause to search for all theitems listed in the warrant. This is not an error that “just a simple glance” would have revealed. Ibid. Indeed, unlike in Groh, the officers here did not merely submittheir application to a magistrate. They also presented itfor review by a superior officer, and a deputy districtattorney, before submitting it to the magistrate. The fact that none of the officials who reviewed the application expressed concern about its validity demonstrates thatany error was not obvious. Groh plainly does not controlthe result here.
* * *
The question in this case is not whether the magistrateerred in believing there was sufficient probable cause tosupport the scope of the warrant he issued. It is instead whether the magistrate so obviously erred that any reasonable officer would have recognized the error. The occasions on which this standard will be met may be rare,but so too are the circumstances in which it will be appropriate to impose personal liability on a lay officer in theface of judicial approval of his actions. Even if the warrant in this case were invalid, it was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that the officers can be considered “plainly incompetent” for concluding otherwise. Malley, supra, at 341. The judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the officers qualified immunity must therefore be reversed.
It is so ordered.
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BREYER, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10–704
CURT MESSERSCHMIDT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
BRENDA MILLENDER, AS EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF AUGUSTA MILLENDER,
DECEASED, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[February 22, 2012]
JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
The Court concludes that the officers acted reasonablyin searching the house for “‘all firearms and firearmrelated items.'” Ante, at 11–12 (emphasis deleted). In support of this conclusion, it cites two sets of circumstances. First, the majority points to “Bowen's possessionof one illegal gun, his gang membership, his willingness touse the gun to kill someone, and his concern about the police . . . .” Ante, at 11. Second, the majority notes that“[a] reasonable officer also could believe that seizure of the firearms was necessary to prevent further assaults onKelly,” because “Bowen had already attempted to murderKelly once with a firearm, and had yelled ‘I'll kill you' as she tried to escape from him.” Ante, at 12. In my view,given all these circumstances together, the officers couldreasonably have believed that the scope of their searchwas supported by probable cause. On that basis, I concur.
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Opinion of KAGAN, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10–704
CURT MESSERSCHMIDT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
BRENDA MILLENDER, AS EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF AUGUSTA MILLENDER,
DECEASED, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[February 22, 2012]
JUSTICE KAGAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Both the Court and the dissent view this case as an all-or-nothing affair: The Court awards immunity acrossthe board to Messerschmidt and his colleagues, while the dissent would grant them none at all. I think the right answer lies in between, although the Court makes themore far-reaching error.
I agree with the Court that a reasonably competent police officer could have thought this warrant valid inauthorizing a search for all firearms and related items. See ante, at 11–12. The warrant application recounted that a known gang member had used a sawed-off shotgun—an illegal weapon under California law, see Cal.Penal Code Ann. §33215 (West 2012 Cum. Supp.)—to try to kill another person. See App. 56–57, 59. Perhaps gangties plus possession of an unlawful gun plus use of that gun to commit a violent assault do not add up to what wasneeded for this search: probable cause to believe thatBowen had additional illegal firearms (or legal firearmsthat he intended to use to violate the law) at the place hewas staying. But because our and the Ninth Circuit's decisions leave that conclusion debatable, a reasonable
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Opinion of KAGAN, J.
police officer could have found the warrant adequately supported by “indicia of probable cause.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 345 (1986). So Messerschmidt and his fellow officers should receive qualified immunity for theirsearch for firearms.
The Court, however, goes astray when it holds that areasonable officer could have thought the warrant valid inapproving a search for evidence of “street gang membership,” App. 52. Membership in even the worst gang doesnot violate California law, so the officers could not search for gang paraphernalia just to establish Bowen's ties tothe Crips. Instead, the police needed probable cause tobelieve that such items would provide evidence of an actual crime—and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 12–14, the only crime mentioned in the warrant application was the assault on Kelly. The problem for the Court is that nothing in the application supports a link betweenBowen's gang membership and that shooting. Contra the Court's elaborate theory-spinning, see ante, at 12–16, Messerschmidt's affidavit in fact characterized the violent assault only as a domestic dispute, not as a gang-relatedone, see App. 55 (describing the crime as a “spousal assault and an assault with a deadly weapon”). And that description is consistent with the most natural understanding of the events. The warrant application thus had a hole at its very center: It lacked any explanation of how gang items would (or even might) provide evidence of thedomestic assault the police were investigating.
To fill this vacuum, the Court proposes an alternative, but similarly inadequate justification—that gang paraphernalia could have demonstrated Bowen's connection tothe Millender residence and to any evidence of the assault found there. The dissent rightly notes one difficulty withthis argument: The discovery of gang items would not have established that Bowen was staying at the house,given that several other gang members regularly did so.
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Opinion of KAGAN, J.
See post, at 8–9 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). And even setting that issue aside, the Court's reasoning proves far too much: It would sanction equally well a search for any of Bowen's possessions on the premises—a result impossible to square with the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463, 480 (1976) (disapproving “‘a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings'” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U. S. 443, 467 (1971))). In authorizing a search for allgang-related items, the warrant far outstripped the officers' probable cause. Because a reasonable officer would have recognized that defect, I would not award qualifiedimmunity to Messerschmidt and his colleagues for this aspect of their search.
Still more fundamentally, the Court errs in scolding theCourt of Appeals for failing to give “weight to the fact thatthe warrant had been reviewed and approved by the officers' superiors, a deputy district attorney, and a neutralmagistrate.” Ante, at 17. As the dissent points out, see post, at 13–15, this Court's holding in Malley is to the opposite effect: An officer is not “entitled to rely on thejudgment of a judicial officer in finding that probablecause exists and hence issuing the warrant.” 475 U. S., at
345. Malley made clear that qualified immunity turnedon the officer's own “professional judgment,” consideredseparately from the mistake of the magistrate. Id., at 346; see ibid., n. 9 (“The officer . . . cannot excuse his owndefault by pointing to the greater incompetence of themagistrate”); id., at 350 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting to the Court's decision to“give little evidentiary weight to the finding of probable cause by a magistrate”). And what we said in Malleyabout a magistrate's authorization applies still more strongly to the approval of other police officers or state attorneys. All those individuals, as the Court puts it, are “part of the prosecution team.” Ante, at 18. To make their
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Opinion of KAGAN, J.
views relevant is to enable those teammates (whether acting in good or bad faith) to confer immunity on eachother for unreasonable conduct—like applying for a warrant without anything resembling probable cause.
For these reasons, I would reverse in part and affirm inpart the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and I wouldremand this case for further proceedings.
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10–704
CURT MESSERSCHMIDT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
BRENDA MILLENDER, AS EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF AUGUSTA MILLENDER,
DECEASED, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[February 22, 2012]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting.
The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause is “to protect against all general searches.” Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357 (1931). The Fourth Amendment was adopted specifically in response to the Crown's practice of using general warrants and writs of assistance to search “suspected places” for evidence of smuggling, libel, or other crimes. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625–626 (1886). Early patriots railed against these practices as “the worst instrumentof arbitrary power” and John Adams later claimed that“the child Independence was born” from colonists' opposition to their use. Id., at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To prevent the issue of general warrants on “loose,vague or doubtful bases of fact,” Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U. S., at 357, the Framers established the inviolable principle that should resolve this case: “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the . . . things to be seized.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. That is, the police must articulate an adequate reason to search for specific items related to specific crimes.
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
In this case, police officers investigating a specific, nongang-related assault committed with a specific firearm (asawed-off shotgun) obtained a warrant to search for allevidence related to “any Street Gang,” “[a]ny photographs. . . which may depict evidence of criminal activity,” and “any firearms.” App. 52. They did so for the assertedreason that the search might lead to evidence related toother gang members and other criminal activity, and thatother “[v]alid warrants commonly allow police to search for ‘firearms and ammunition.'” See infra, at 8–9. That kind of general warrant is antithetical to the Fourth Amendment.
The Court nonetheless concludes that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was“objectively reasonable.” I could not disagree more. All 13 federal judges who previously considered this case had little difficulty concluding that the police officers' search for any gang-related material violated the FourthAmendment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 28–29, 45, n. 7, 73, 94, 157–158. And a substantial majority agreed thatthe police's search for both gang-related material and allfirearms not only violated the Fourth Amendment, butwas objectively unreasonable. Like them, I believe that any “reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner's position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 345 (1986).
The Court also hints that a police officer's otherwise unreasonable conduct may be excused by the approval ofa magistrate, or more disturbingly, another police officer. Ante, at 16–18. That is inconsistent with our focus on the objective reasonableness of an officer's decision to submit a warrant application to a magistrate, and we long agorejected it. See Malley, 475 U. S., at 345–346.
The Court's analysis bears little relationship to therecord in this case, our precedents, or the purposes underCite
as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
lying qualified immunity analysis. For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I The Court holds that a well-trained officer could have reasonably concluded that there was probable cause tosearch the Millenders' residence for any evidence of affiliation with “any Street Gang,” and “all handguns, rifles, or shotguns of any caliber, or any firearms capable of firingammunition.” App. 52.1 I cannot agree.
A Most troubling is the Court's determination that petitioners reasonably could have concluded that they had probable cause to search for all evidence of any gang affiliation in the Millenders' home. The Court reaches this result only by way of an unprecedented, post hoc reconstruction of the crime that wholly ignores the police's own conclusions, as well as the undisputed facts presented tothe District Court. The Court primarily theorizes that “[a] reasonable of- ficer could certainly view Bowen's attack as motivated not by the souring of his romantic relationship with Kellybut instead by a desire to prevent her from disclosingdetails of his gang activity to the police.” Ante, at 13. The majority therefore dismisses as “misleading” the Millenders' characterization of the case as a “domestic dispute,”insisting that Detective Messerschmidt could have reasonably thought that the crime was gang related. See ante, at 13–14.2 —————— 1Not even the Court defends the warrant's authorization to search for “[a]ny photographs . . . which may depict evidence of criminal activity.” 2The Court implies Detective Messerschmidt did not consider thecrime “solely . . . a domestic dispute” because he labeled it a “spousalassault and an assault with a deadly weapon.” Ante, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Solely domestic disputes often involve gun violence, however. See Sorenson & Weibe, Weapons in the Lives of
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
The police flatly rejected that hypothesis, however, con- cluding that the crime was a domestic dispute that wasnot in any way gang related. Detective Messerschmidt's deposition is illustrative.
“Q: So as far as you knew, it was just sort of a spousalabuse-type case where the perpetrator happened to be in a gang, right?“A: Correct. “Q: So you didn't have any reason to believe that the assault on Kelly was any sort of gang crime, did you? “A: No.” Record in No. CV 05–2298 DDP (RZx) (CD Cal.) (hereinafter Record), Doc. 51, (Exh. X), p. 120 (hereinafter Deposition).3
The “Crime Analysis” forms prepared by the police like——————
Battered Women, 94 Am. J. Pub. Health 1412, 1413 (2004) (notingmore than one-third of female domestic violence shelter residents in California reported having been threatened or harmed with a firearm). That was the case here. In any event, the Court's reading of Detective Messerschmidt's affidavit is incompatible with his testimony that thecrime was “just sort of a spousal-abuse-type case,” not a “gang crime.”See supra this page.
3By suggesting that courts assessing qualified immunity should ignore police officers' testimony about the information they possessed atthe time of the search, ante, at 14–15, n. 6, the Court misreads Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 815–819 (1982), and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 645 (1987). In Harlow, we adopted a qualified immunity test focusing on an officer's objective good faith, rather than whether the officer searched “with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.” 457 U. S., at 815. As we have explained, “examination of the information possessed by the searching officials . . . does not reintroduce into qualified immunityanalysis the inquiry into officials' subjective intent that Harlow sought to minimize.” Anderson, 483 U. S., at 641. It is therefore highlyrelevant that Detective Messerschmidt testified that he lacked “anyreason” to consider the crime gang related, supra this page, and possessed no “information” that there were handguns in the Millenders' home, infra, at 11. Courts cannot ignore information in crime analysis forms, ballistic reports, or victim interviews by labeling such information “conclusions.”
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
wise identified Bowen as a “Mona Park Crip” gang member, but did not check off “gang-related” as a motive for theattack. See App. 41, 44 (Crime Analysis SupplementalForm–M. O. Factors). And the District Court noted it wasundisputed that Detective Messerschmidt “had no reason to believe Bowen's crime was a ‘gang' crime.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 115.4
The police's conclusions matched the victim's own account of the attack. Kelly asked police officers to help hermove out because Bowen “ha[d] a domestic violence on hisrecord,” had “hit [her] once or twice” already, had repeatedly threatened her “You'll never leave me. I'll kill youif you leave me,” and she was “planning on breaking up”with him. Record, Doc. 51 (Exh. C), pp. 5–6 (hereinafter Kelly Interview). As Kelly described the confrontation, it was only after she fled to her car in order to leave thatBowen reemerged from their shared apartment with the shotgun and told her “I'm gonna kill your ass right here ifyou take off,” consistent with his prior threats. Id., at 7–8. Every piece of information, therefore, accorded with Detective Messerschmidt's conclusion: The crime was domestic violence that was not gang related.5 ——————
4The Court is wrong to imply that courts should not consider “factsoutside the affidavit,” but within the officers' possession, when assessing qualified immunity. Ante, at 10, n. 2. Our precedents makeclear that the objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct is judged“in light of clearly established law and the information the officers possessed.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 615 (1999). If an officer possesses information indicating that he lacks probable cause to search,and that information was not presented to the neutral magistrate whenhe approved the search, it is particularly likely that “a reasonably welltrained officer would have known that the search was illegal despitethe magistrate's authorization.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922, n. 23 (1984).
5To support its theory that Bowen attacked Kelly to keep her silentabout his gang activity, the majority relies principally on its claim thatBowen yelled, “ ‘I told you never to call the cops on me bitch!' ” ante, at 2, citing it no less than five times. See, ante, at 11 (Bowen “attempt[ed]
6 M